system with gender quotas for the national parliament. 5 Discussions about female political participation in post-genocide Rwanda tend to assume that increased participation by women will lead to greater gender equality and a 'better,' more peaceful society, yet these changes have not necessarily increased the political power of women or led to more egalitarian notions of citizenship. The second phenomenon I will explore is the ways in which the Rwandan state has become increasingly authoritarian under the guise of 'democratization.' As a result of this increasing authoritarianism, female political participation represents a paradox in the short-term:
as their participation has increased, women's ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In the long-term, however, the increased participation of women could prepare the path for their authoritarianism gives way to democracy, human rights abuses to the rule of law, and corruption to good governance. 7 According to this paradigm, the democratic transition process passes through a series of distinct stages: opening, breakthrough and consolidation. 8 In diplomatic and development circles, and particularly US foreign policy, elections are the fundamental component of democratic transition, often to the exclusion of other important aspects of democracy defined in political theory. Under this paradigm, Rwanda's transition started well before the 1994 genocide with a political opening in 1989.
In 1989, several political parties, which had been dormant under the single-party state and dictatorship of President Habyarimana, re-emerged and began demanding political liberalisation. Along with a few civil society organizations that were also pushing for change, their pleas coincided with increasing pressure in the international community for authoritarian states to democratize. In many cases, this pressure tied political reforms to aid money, a particularly sensitive issue for the Rwandan government, as the country was almost entirely interviews and focus groups with women's organizations, women members of government, and women leaders of civil society organizations. Habyarimana's dictatorship. The civil war continued throughout the early 1990s until
Habyarimana, facing dramatic losses as well as continued pressure from donors, was forced to the negotiating table. The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords brought an official end to hostilities and outlined a transition plan to move the country to multiparty politics and democratic elections.
The transition, which had been limping along, was brought to a dramatic and violent halt in April 1994 when Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down by unknown assailants. Immediately, Hutu extremists took control of the government and perpetrated a genocide against Tutsi and others defined as 'enemies' of the state. At the same time, the RPF resumed the civil war against the government army, which was also involved in the genocide.
The genocide ended when the RPF took military control of the majority of the territory, driving the Hutu-extremist government, militias, and army into exile, along with nearly two million civilians.
On 19 July 1994, the RPF named a transitional government, which it called the 'Government of National Unity,' whose composition reaffirmed the RPF's commitment to power sharing outlined in the Arusha Accords. The RPF announced that the transitional government would remain in power for five years. As part of its reconstruction efforts, the Transitional 17 Among the first human rights organizations to be suppressed was the umbrella, CLADHO, which was infiltrated and dismantled from within in 1996. The most recent was LIPRODHOR, which was the only local human rights organization to report critically on the RPF regime and RPA. In 2003, the members of Parliament denounced
To quell protest from the diplomatic and international aid communities, the RPF has dressed its increasingly authoritarian governance in democratic clothing by promoting its policies as the best methods to ensure 'security' and 'good governance'. In addition, the regime has increased the participation of all citizens in the political system through an elaborate local level administration, as well as a complicated, tiered electoral system for the Parliament and presidency. Finally, the regime has increased the representations of under-represented groups, particularly women and youth. Yet, in 1998, most rural Rwandans (male or female, and even including some women who are members of them) did not understand the mission of most of the women's councils.
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Outside the few communes where NGOs were implementing women-in-development projects and used the structures to mobilize women, these structures existed in name only, or simply became the standard for local level elections when 'democratization' was initiated by the Transitional Government in 1999. 27 One cell is composed of roughly 100-200 households. Rwandan administrative structure is extremely hierarchical and penetrates to the most basic level. The levels from smallest to largest are: ten houses (nyumbakumi), cell (akagare), sector (umurenge), district (akarere), province (intara), and national (igihugu). The names of certain of these designations were changed in English and Kinyarwanda with the administrative reorganizations of December 2000 and January 2006.. 28 The 1998 elections for women's leaders were the model for local elections in 1999. In both elections, the population queued publicly behind the candidate 'of their choice.' The panel of candidates was selected minutes before the voting. There were no campaigns and no public debate about the candidates. 29 The exception being certain positions that mirrored the appointed administrative positions (responsable and conseiller) that they replaced.
served as a channel to disseminate government directives from the top to the bottom. They were mere symbols of inclusion, which appeared to be in line with foreign aid ideas, rather than 'grassroots structures' feeding the will of the people upwards in the governance hierarchy.
Cognisant of the lack of clear purpose for the women's councils, in 1999 the Ministry announced the implementation of women's development funds to be distributed through these structures as loans to finance income-generating projects. These funds were intended to penetrate to the lowest level (cell) of the administration, that is, directly to the 'grassroots.' In most communities where I conducted interviews between 1999 and 2001, local women did not know these funds existed or whether they were functioning in their communities. Generally, only a few elite women (who also held positions with the women's grassroots structure at the commune level)
knew anything about the funds.
Perhaps the area where the RPF's pro-woman policies are most evident is in the legislative branch. Before the resumption of the civil war in 1994, few women had ever served as parliamentarians (see Table 1 ). The first Transitional National Parliament (TNP) appointed in 1994, included 10 women, including 3 of the 13 RPF deputies. 30 Between 1994 and 2003, members of the TNP were appointed by the Political Party Forum (a body widely perceived as a mechanism for RPF dominance) after being nominated by the political parties included in the government. Over time, the number of women in parliament increased (see Table 1 first African woman ever elected president, whose speech to the plenary highlighted the usefulness of the RPF's pro-woman policies and its relatively new role as host to international conferences:
[government policies have encouraged] women not only to partake of the democratic process but also to be full participants in the governance of their societies and countries.
This has facilitated networking at the grass-roots, local, national and international levels thereby creating an appropriate political environment that continues to nurture what you can proudly call your home grown democracy. … In light of such achievements against the backdrop of your recent political past, we congratulate and encourage you for having risen up to the challenge of creating a network that has focused on a process of nation building underpinned by a gender perspective. Beyond these influential passers-by, the RPF's pro-woman policies, as well as its efforts As detailed above, women had little choice but to recreate their lives from 'less than nothing,' as more than one female genocide survivor described it to me. Yet the women's movement in Rwanda predates the genocide.
Early in the post-colonial period, the government of the First Republic supported social centres (foyers sociaux) for women in each prefecture. These centres focused on the needs of rural women, such as literacy and health education, but they also provided opportunities for leadership to the educated women who staffed them. 43 While the government of the Second Republic largely excluded women from governance or key posts in the ministries, farming cooperatives and grassroots-level church-related groups grew in number, thanks in part to the influx of international funding and technical assistance aimed at rural development. 48 In their appeals, the emissaries underscored the need for everyone to help rebuild the country. An unforeseen benefit of the women's micro-lending cooperative, Duterimbere, was that individual accounts at the organization's savings bank remained intact unlike accounts in some of the major commercial banks, which had been looted during the genocide. 49 These small savings accounts allowed many women and families to 46 Ibid. 47 Prime Minister Uwilingimana was killed in the first days of the genocide in April 1994 so that she could not speak out against it. Although a Hutu, she was among the top priorities on the Presidential Guard's roster of people to eliminate. She was killed along with 10 Belgian peacekeepers that were part of the UNAMIR mission. Despite these significant contributions, the Rwandan women's movement in the mid to late 1990s should be viewed as being principally indigenous rather than simply driven by outside forces. While the Rwandan women's organizations would not have been able to make as much of an impact without international aid, the majority of the local organizations did not allow the agendas of international partners to drive their work plans. Many local women's civil society organizations were scrambling to negotiate the complex international aid systems so that they could become partners of international NGOs or direct recipients of international aid grants.
57
Beyond the financial impact of the international community, the international women's movement provided inspiration and technical knowledge to Rwandan women (for instance, the various International Conferences on Women). Female leaders of civil society organizations in Rwanda were frequently sent to international conferences or educational exchanges where they met women from other developing nations who faced similar challenges. They returned energized by their discussions with these 'third world' feminists. 58 In addition, they networked with feminists from Europe, North America, and Australia who had the resources to provide continuing assistance to Rwandan women's organizations.
Collaboration between women in government and civil society: the 1998 'inheritance law'
In the 1990s in Rwanda, particularly after the genocide, women's organizations had greater space in which to manoeuvre and advocate for women's rights than many other civil society organizations, especially than local human rights or indigenous rights organizations. At the time, women's organizations were largely perceived as apolitical by the government and the RPF. Since protecting women's rights and promoting women's involvement in the public sphere and governance were core components of RPF policy, the government did not step in to curtail the work of women's organizations as it did with human rights organizations.
To understand the unique position of women's NGOs in the late 1990s in Rwanda, it is important to understand something about the RPF's conceptualisation of the relationship between civil society and the state. RPF leaders envision civil society as an extension of, rather than as a counter-balance to, the state. While this vision of civil society is antithetical to current political and democratic theory, it is a logical extension of the RPF's African nationalism, which insists on 'national unity' and rejects critiques of government policy by outsiders (such as the how to manipulate the state, even a repressive state, to achieve a common goal. As Bauer and
Britton have noted, 'rather than demonizing the state as an entity of oppression, women are increasingly moving from resisting the state to using the state' in Africa. 62 Among these key leaders were many women who had been involved in civil society organizations and political parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, they knew how to influence policy under a totalitarian state where the levers of power are hidden from public view. Third, these female lobbyists couched their advocacy to male audiences in terms of family-oriented, 'motherist'
politics by appealing to the men's sense of justice for their own mothers' and daughters' rights. meant that women had access to decision-makers throughout the government. 64 Although women constituted less than 25 percent of parliament at the time, the presence of women in parliament and elsewhere allowed both women in government and in civil society to advocate for the inheritance bill in all corners of the government. 65 The success of women in these advocacy efforts suggests that limited forms of democratic participation are possible under an authoritarian government. Thus, many women's civil society organizations were faced with a vacuum in leadership. The women who stepped in to take their places were either not as well equipped to advocate on contentious women's issues (such as land rights) or were more interested in personal gains, particularly those who stepped into well-paid staff positions. Many of the younger women who stepped into these positions were better educated than the women they replaced since they had university degrees. 68 Although these younger women were better educated, they lacked the 66 Ibid. A final reason the women's movement has been set back is that women have not found a unifying issue to rally around since the promulgation of the inheritance law in 1998. Land tenure and land use are among the most volatile political issues in Rwanda today, and the present situation poses the risk of widespread violence. 69 Given that the vast majority of Rwandan women are subsistence farmers and that women, and female-headed households in particular, are among the people most vulnerable to losing access to land, it would seem that land rights would society (including the international NGOs) has followed suit. In Rwanda today, many women undertake university studies. 
Emasculation of the women's movement

Conclusions
The lasting repercussions of the 1994 genocide, the material realities of life in postgenocide Rwanda, and the greater representation of women in public life and political office have promoted a great deal of change in cultural and social conceptions of gender roles. With these changes has come a greater acceptance of women in positions of authority and of women as independent agents in the public sphere. Through its policies, the RPF has linked gender equality to nationalism. As a whole, the top-down gender initiatives of the RPF have had a positive impact on gender equality and have transformed the collective cultural imagination:
'wives' and 'daughters' have a wider range of socially circumscribed agencies in the 'New Rwanda', and they are conceiving of themselves and their agencies in the world differently.
Increased female political participation in Rwanda represents a paradox in the short-term: as their participation has increased, women's ability to influence policy-making has decreased. In the long-term, however, increased female representation in government could prepare the path for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy because of a transformation in political subjectivity.
This case of an authoritarian, single-party state pushing for greater gender equality highlights a few key points relevant to political theory and democratization studies as well as to the increasingly female political representation across Africa. First of all, even in an authoritarian state, policy can be influenced by interest groups (such as women) who have access to decision-makers and who have the political savvy to operate the hidden levers of power.
Second, the emphasis on elections in lieu of other aspects of democratic governance may reduce rather than increase the capacity of interest groups to shape policy. Third, top-down gender initiatives, even when implemented by authoritarian regimes, can lead to transformations in political identities, subjectivities, and agencies. Finally, these transformations in political subjectivity may pave the way for effective engagement in democratic governance should it emerge. 
